Raj HC refuses to quash charge-sheet against Drug Controller, holds delay not fatal without prejudice

Jaipur: The Rajasthan High Court has declined to interfere with disciplinary proceedings initiated against a senior Drug Control officer, holding that mere delay in issuance of a charge-sheet or appointment of an enquiry officer does not vitiate departmental proceedings unless the delinquent employee demonstrates manifest prejudice. The Court further held that guidelines issued by the Central Government under Section 33P of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 are binding on State authorities and cannot be diluted or deviated from by individual officers acting on their own authority.

The ruling was delivered by Justice Anand Sharma in S.B. Civil Writ Petition Nos. 19397/2025 and 19398/2025, filed by Rajaram Sharma, a former Drug Controller, Rajasthan. The judgment was pronounced on 25 February 2026. displinary

The petitioner, who was appointed as a Drug Inspector in 1994 and later promoted as Drug Controller in 2017, challenged two separate charge-sheets issued under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958, along with consequential orders appointing an Inquiry Officer. The principal challenge was founded on alleged inordinate and unexplained delay in initiation and continuation of disciplinary proceedings, vagueness of charges, and lack of jurisdiction.

The controversy in the first writ petition arose from the petitioner’s decision in June 2020 to constitute a seven-member committee of Assistant Drug Controllers to deliberate upon Central Government guidelines relating to prosecution in cases involving drugs declared as “not of standard quality.” Acting on the committee’s report, the petitioner forwarded recommendations to the Drug Controller General of India suggesting relaxation in prosecution norms for certain categories of substandard drugs, without prior approval of the State Government. The State later alleged that such action amounted to excess of authority and misuse of official position, particularly in light of the binding nature of Central guidelines issued under Section 33P of the 1940 Act.

The petitioner contended that the committee was constituted purely for administrative efficiency, that the guidelines were directory in nature, and that no statutory provision had been violated. He further argued that the charge-sheet issued in September 2022, nearly two years after the alleged acts, and the appointment of an Inquiry Officer in October 2025, were vitiated by gross delay causing serious prejudice.

Rejecting these submissions, the High Court noted that immediately upon coming to know of the petitioner’s communication to the Central authorities, a show-cause notice had been issued in January 2021 and the petitioner’s reply was duly examined at multiple administrative levels before a conscious decision was taken to initiate disciplinary proceedings. The Court held that time consumed in administrative scrutiny and decision-making could not be characterised as arbitrary or unexplained delay.

On the delay in appointment of the Inquiry Officer, the Court observed that the petitioner himself had contributed to prolonging the proceedings by submitting replies in piecemeal, repeatedly seeking inspection of documents, and raising procedural objections. In such circumstances, the petitioner could not later assail the proceedings solely on the ground of delay.

The Court reiterated the settled principle that delay by itself does not invalidate disciplinary proceedings unless it results in serious and demonstrable prejudice. Relying on Supreme Court precedents including P.V. Mahadevan v. TN Housing Board, Anant R. Kulkarni v. Y.P. Education Society, and Kunisetty Satyanarayana, the Court held that judicial review at the stage of charge-sheet is extremely limited and interference is warranted only in rare cases where proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or patently illegal.

On the issue of authority, the High Court categorically rejected the petitioner’s claim that, by virtue of holding the post of Drug Controller, he could act as the “State Government” for the purposes of implementing Central guidelines. The Court held that under the statutory scheme and the Rajasthan Rules of Business framed under Article 166 of the Constitution, the term “State Government” refers to the competent authority acting through the Secretary or Principal Secretary of the concerned department, and not an individual departmental head. In the absence of express delegation, the Drug Controller remained an implementing authority and could not assume powers reserved for the State Government.

The Court further held that guidelines issued by the Central Government under Section 33P of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act are binding in nature, aimed at ensuring uniformity in enforcement of drug regulatory standards across the country. Any unilateral deviation or dilution by a State officer, without approval of the State Government, prima facie amounted to acting beyond jurisdiction.

Addressing the plea of vagueness, the Court found that the charge-sheet clearly spelt out the factual allegations, including constitution of an unauthorised committee, forwarding of recommendations without approval, deviation from binding guidelines, and alleged benefit to manufacturers in cases involving substandard drugs. The fact that the petitioner had submitted detailed replies was held to be sufficient proof that he understood the charges and was not prejudiced in preparing his defence.

The High Court also found no material to support allegations of mala fides, observing that such pleas must be backed by specific and cogent evidence.

In conclusion, the Court held that both writ petitions were premature and devoid of merit. Upholding the charge-sheets and the appointment of the Inquiry Officer, the Court declined to interfere and left all issues open to be examined during the departmental enquiry.