Magistrate cannot mechanically direct FIR against police officials without following Section 223 BNSS safeguards: Rajasthan HC

Jodhpur: The Rajasthan High Court has set aside an order of the Special Court, SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act Cases, Sri Ganganagar, which had directed the Superintendent of Police to register an FIR against four police officers under Section 175(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS).

Justice Farjand Ali held that even at the stage of directing registration of an FIR under Section 175(3) of the BNSS, a Magistrate is bound to adhere to the mandatory safeguards under Section 223 of the BNSS when the complaint is directed against public servants for acts purportedly done in the discharge of their official duties. The impugned order was quashed for being non-speaking and for failing to comply with this statutory mandate.

The four petitioners — Prashant Kaushik (Deputy Superintendent of Police), Manohar Singh (Assistant Sub Inspector), Sardar Singh (Sub Inspector), and Kishan Singh (Police Driver) — were all posted at Police Station Anoopgarh, District Sri Ganganagar, Rajasthan. The case arose from a sequence of cross-FIRs between the parties.

On 20 August 2025, an FIR was registered at Police Station Anupgarh on the complaint of one Sanjay Kumar against Tek Chand (the respondent-complainant in the present case) and others, for offences under Sections 115(2), 126(2) and 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) as well as Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) and 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. After investigation, the police submitted a charge-sheet against Tek Chand on 21 October 2025.

On 25 September 2025, Tek Chand in turn lodged FIR No. 587/2025 at the same police station against Sanjay Kumar and others for offences under the BNS. However, upon investigation, the Investigating Officer submitted a negative final report dated 25 November 2025, observing that the FIR appeared to have been lodged with an oblique motive to exert undue pressure in retaliation to the earlier FIR No. 500/2025.

On 1 November 2025 — before the negative final report was even submitted — Tek Chand filed a criminal complaint before the Special SC/ST Court under Section 175(3) of the BNSS, alleging various offences under the BNS and the SC/ST Act against the present petitioners, primarily on the ground of alleged irregularities in the investigation of FIR and inaction on a complaint he had submitted to the Director General of Police (Vigilance), Jaipur. The Special Judge, by the impugned order dated 21 November 2025, directed the Superintendent of Police, Sri Ganganagar to register an FIR against the petitioners, without hearing them and without obtaining any report from their superior officer. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed the present revision petition before the High Court.

Appearing for the petitioners, Mr. Anand Purohit, Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. D.S. Thind and other counsel, contended that the impugned order was non-speaking and had been passed in a mechanical and perfunctory manner, without any application of judicial mind. Counsel argued that the allegations in the complaint were squarely directed against public servants for acts done in the discharge of their official duties and that the Magistrate was therefore required, before directing registration of an FIR, to comply with the mandatory safeguards under Section 223 of the BNSS — namely, affording the accused public servants an opportunity to be heard and obtaining a report from their superior officer. The failure to follow this procedure, counsel submitted, rendered the impugned order legally unsustainable.

On behalf of the respondents, Mr. N.S. Chandawat, Deputy Government Advocate, and Mr. Shrawan Choudhary sought to sustain the order, arguing that at the stage of directing registration of an FIR under Section 175(3) of the BNSS, a Magistrate does not take cognizance of the offence and is therefore not required to follow the procedure under Section 223 of the BNSS, which is applicable only at the cognizance stage.

Justice Farjand Ali began by noting that the petitioners are public servants and that the predominant allegations against them substantially arose from and were intrinsically connected with the discharge of their official duties — specifically, the investigation of FIR No. 587/2025 and the consequential procedural actions taken therein. Although the complaint also contained allegations of abuse, use of force, and assault, the Court observed that such allegations could not exist in isolation given the backdrop of pre-existing criminal litigation and cross-FIRs. The respondent-complainant himself stood arraigned as an accused in FIR No. 500/2025, and his own FIR No. 587/2025 had culminated in a negative final report with observations of retaliatory intent. In such circumstances, allegations against police officials arising in proximity to investigative proceedings were “highly disputed questions of fact, which are susceptible to being easily alleged and cannot be mechanically accepted at face value without preliminary judicial scrutiny.”

The Court then examined Section 223 of the BNSS, which introduces a substantive safeguard at the pre-cognizance stage. Sub-section (2) of Section 223 specifically mandates that where a complaint is directed against a public servant for acts purportedly committed in discharge of official duties, the Magistrate shall not proceed to take cognizance unless two essential conditions are satisfied: first, the public servant must be afforded an opportunity to explain the circumstances leading to the alleged incident; and second, a factual report must be obtained from the public servant’s superior officer. The Court characterised this provision as “a judicial filter, a protective sieve, to ensure that criminal law is not set into motion mechanically or as a tool of vendetta, particularly in cases where allegations stem from official actions.”

The Court directly addressed the State’s argument that Section 223 applies only at the cognizance stage, and not when a Magistrate is merely directing registration of an FIR under Section 175(3) of the BNSS. Justice Farjand Ali held that the expression “while taking cognizance” employed in Section 223 is of wide amplitude and signifies not merely the final act of taking cognizance, but also the “preparatory stage where the Magistrate is required to judiciously assess the complaint before proceeding further.” Once the Magistrate embarks upon an evaluative exercise — reading the complaint, appreciating its averments, and forming an opinion as to whether police machinery ought to be invoked — that itself reflects an incipient application of mind akin to the stage “while taking cognizance” under Section 223. Accordingly, even if the direction under Section 175(3) does not technically amount to taking cognizance, the statutory safeguards under Section 223(2) “cannot be rendered otiose by resorting to Section 175(3) in a routine manner.”

Turning to the impugned order, the Court found it “non-speaking and mechanical” and lacking any application of judicial mind to the peculiar facts of the case — the existence of prior FIRs, the negative final report, and the apparent retaliatory nature of the complaint. The Special Judge had not examined whether the allegations fell within the scope of official duty, had not heard the police officers, and had not called for a report from their superior authority. The Court held that “the law does not countenance a blind or mechanical forwarding of complaints for registration of FIR; rather, it obligates the Magistrate to read, analyse, and scrutinize the complaint with care.” The failure to undertake this exercise meant the impugned order stood “vitiated for non-application of mind and for failure to adhere to the statutory mandate.”

Justice Farjand Ali set aside the impugned order dated 21 November 2025 and quashed all consequential proceedings taken pursuant to it. The matter was remanded to the Special Court for fresh adjudication de novo. The Court was careful to preserve the complainant’s remedy: the Special Court was directed not to proceed mechanically, but first to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the allegations, strictly adhering to the requirements of Section 223 of the BNSS. During this inquiry, the police officer petitioners must be given a meaningful opportunity of hearing as a substantive safeguard, and a report from the competent superior authority must be called for and considered. Only upon completion of such inquiry — and after duly weighing the explanation of the concerned public servants, the background of prior FIRs, the nature of allegations, and the outcome of earlier investigations — must the Magistrate pass a well-reasoned speaking order, either dismissing the complaint or proceeding to take cognizance and issue process, as the case may warrant. The revision petition was disposed of accordingly, and all pending applications were also disposed of.

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