JDA cannot cancel Assistant Advocates’ engagement without citing unsatisfactory work performance: Rajasthan HC

Jaipur: The Rajasthan High Court has allowed a batch of writ petitions filed by Assistant Advocates engaged by the Jaipur Development Authority (JDA), quashing the order dated 14 November 2025 by which their engagements were cancelled en masse. Justice Ganesh Ram Meena, pronouncing judgment on 25 March 2026, held that the cancellation was arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, as the respondents failed to establish that the work performance of any petitioner was unsatisfactory — the only permissible ground for removal under the terms of their own engagement orders.

The petitioners were engaged as Assistant Advocates by the Jaipur Development Authority and had received satisfactory work performance reports. On 14 November 2025, the JDA issued an order cancelling their engagements, purportedly at the direction of the Hon’ble Minister, without citing any deficiency in the work of any individual petitioner. The petitioners approached the High Court through a batch of writ petitions — including S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 18266/2025 and connected petitions bearing numbers 6626/2021, 6629/2021, 9107/2021, 9112/2021, 9751/2021, 18267–18275/2025, 18321/2025, and 18680/2025 — challenging the cancellation as arbitrary and unconstitutional. The terms and conditions of engagement framed by the JDA itself provided that Assistant Advocates could be removed only if their work performance was found to be unsatisfactory.

Counsel for the petitioners — including Mr. Kamlakar Sharma (Senior Advocate) with Mr. Yogesh Kalla and Mr. Ranvijay Singh, and Mr. R.N. Mathur (Senior Advocate) with Mr. Sahil Sharma and Mr. Ashish Sharma, as well as Mr. Ravi Shanker Sharma, Mr. Pawan Sharma, Mr. Azad Ahmed, and Mr. Dinesh Yadav with Mr. Ankit Yadav — submitted that the JDA had prescribed removal only for unsatisfactory work performance, and that the petitioners’ performance reports were satisfactory. The cancellation, it was argued, was made arbitrarily at the direction of the Minister without any adherence to the prescribed terms, rendering it violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The petitioners relied principally on Kumari Shrilekha Vidyaarthi v. State of U.P. [(1991) 1 SCC 212], in which the Supreme Court held that Government Law Officers are holders of public offices and that, even in contractual matters, the State cannot act arbitrarily — such arbitrary action being liable to be set aside as violative of Article 14.

Counsel for the JDA — including Mr. Abhishek Sharma with Ms. Pooja Sharma, Mr. Rishabh Khandelwal, and Mr. Ajay Shukla with Mr. Raghav Sharma — contended that the engagements were purely contractual in nature and that the petitioners had no vested right to continuance. They submitted that the State and public authorities are free to engage lawyers of their choice and confidence. JDA relied on Anita & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra (Supreme Court), in which contractual appointments on 11-month renewable terms were held to have naturally concluded after the maximum permissible period; on Om Prakash Joshi v. State of Rajasthan (Division Bench, Rajasthan High Court), which held that the State Government has the liberty to appoint advocates of its choice and confidence and courts ought not to interfere in the matter; and on Sushi Kumar Gupta v. State of U.P. (Allahabad High Court), which distinguished “appointment” from “engagement,” the latter not carrying permanent rights.

Justice Meena drew extensively on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Kumari Shrilekha Vidyaarthi v. State of U.P. [(1991) 1 SCC 212], which established that even where an appointment or engagement is contractual, the State cannot act arbitrarily, and any such arbitrary action is liable to be set aside as violative of Article 14. The Court also relied on Ashok Kumar Nigam v. State of U.P., where the Supreme Court set aside an en bloc non-renewal of government counsel’s term, holding it to be a non-speaking order suffering from non-application of mind and therefore an arbitrary exercise of power. The Court further drew on principles from Johri Mal v. State of Rajasthan (Supreme Court) on the scope of judicial review of the decision-making process, and cited R. Muthukrishnan v. The Registrar General of the High Court of Judicature at Madras (Supreme Court, W.P.(C) No. 612 of 2012, decided on 28 January 2019), which underscored the dignity of the legal profession and the indispensable role of advocates in the justice delivery system.

The judgments relied upon by JDA were carefully distinguished. Anita & Anr. was held inapplicable because in that case the contractual appointments had run their full permissible course of three terms of eleven months each and services came to an end on efflux of the maximum contractual period; in the present case, the petitioners were disengaged during the subsistence of their engagement without any finding of unsatisfactory work. Om Prakash Joshi was distinguished on the ground that it concerned constitutional posts such as Advocate General and Additional Advocate General, which are not governed by the same framework as panel advocates with defined engagement terms.

The Court’s central conclusion was recorded at paragraph 28: “This Court is also of the view that the State has an authority to engage the lawyers of its own choice and confidence, however, any action for engagement or their removal should be reasonable and not arbitrary. When the terms and conditions of engagements of Assistant Advocates like the petitioners provide for their removal only on count of work performance then the respondents could not disengage or cancel their engagements at their whims.”

At paragraphs 31 and 32, the Court further observed that lawyers cannot be treated like servants and that their dignity demands adherence to reasonable terms and conditions: “The respondents-authorities cannot be allowed to engage or disengage a lawyer for a legal work at their whims. The engagement or disengagement has to be in accordance with some procedure and terms and conditions.” Since the JDA had neglected the very terms and conditions incorporated in its own engagement orders, the act of cancellation was held to be arbitrary and deserving of being quashed.

The Court allowed all the writ petitions. The orders cancelling the engagement of the petitioners as Assistant Advocates were quashed and set aside. The JDA was directed to continue the petitioners as Assistant Advocates on the terms, conditions, and remuneration as applicable at present. In addition to restoring the engagements, the Court issued three further directions: first, that the JDA frame comprehensive policy, guidelines, or instructions regarding eligibility, tenure, and procedure for engagement and removal of Assistant Advocates; second, that the petitioners be allowed to continue as Assistant Advocates until their work is found unsatisfactory or until such a policy is framed and fresh engagements are made in accordance with it; and third, that the new policy incorporate provisions to ensure representation of women lawyers and lawyers from scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, backward classes, and weaker sections of society, as the JDA is an instrumentality of the Government of Rajasthan and the remuneration is paid from the public exchequer.

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