‘Inherent powers must be exercised sparingly’: Rajasthan HC refuses to quash Drugs Act case

Jaipur: The Rajasthan High Court has refused to quash a 2018 criminal complaint against a Himachal Pradesh pharma partner whose drug was found misbranded at Kota. Justice Chandra Prakash Shrimali passed the order on 25 April 2026, holding that the partner must face trial before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kota.

The case began with a routine inspection at the District Drug Warehouse in Kota on 23 April 2015. Drugs Control Officer Prahlad Kumar Meena drew samples of a medicine manufactured by M/s Orison Pharma International, a firm based in Kala Amb, Himachal Pradesh. A Government Analyst’s report later declared the drug “not of standard quality” because the contents did not match what was printed on the label.

Following a show cause notice, the firm’s partner Rakesh Goyal explained that the discrepancy was a printing and packaging error, not a defect in the medicine itself. The composition of the drug, he said, was within permissible standards. The drug had also remained with the authorities and never reached any patient.

The drug control authorities were not satisfied. They filed a complaint before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kota on 9 May 2018, prosecuting Goyal and the firm under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. Goyal then approached the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This provision gives the court inherent power to quash a criminal proceeding if continuing it would be an abuse of process.

Counsel Sanjay Kumar Jain, with Akshay Jain, argued that the complaint was an abuse of the process of law. The mismatch between the label and the contents was an inadvertent printing error. There was no criminal intent, and the drug had never been released for public consumption.

Counsel also raised a jurisdiction objection. He submitted that the medicine had been manufactured at Kala Amb in Himachal Pradesh, not at Kota, and the court at Kota therefore could not try the case. A separate ground was that the complaint did not specifically allege facts to fasten vicarious liability on the petitioner under Section 34 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act. Section 34 makes a partner or director personally liable for an offence committed by the firm. But the law applies only if that person was “in charge of and responsible to” the company for its business at the relevant time.

The Public Prosecutor Vijay Singh Yadav, assisted by Additional Government Advocate Gaurav Gupta, opposed the petition. They submitted that the inspection, sample-drawing and seizure had all happened in Kota — so part of the cause of action arose there. The Government Analyst report, on its face, showed the drug was misbranded under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act.

They also pointed out that the petitioner himself had admitted, in his replies to the show cause notice, that there was a printing and packaging error. Whether the error was bona fide and whether the drug was actually distributed to consumers were disputed questions of fact. These could only be answered after trial, the State submitted, not in a Section 482 quashing petition.

On territorial jurisdiction, the High Court held that the Kota court was competent to try the case. The drug had reached the District Drug Warehouse at Kota, and the inspection and seizure had taken place there. That was enough to give Kota a part of the cause of action.

The Court relied on the Supreme Court’s ruling in State of Punjab v. Nohar Chand (1984) 3 SCC 512. There, it was held that a manufacturer of substandard goods can be tried where those goods are marketed or found, not only where they were manufactured. The Bombay High Court’s decision in Mediscarch Laboratories v. State of Goa, 1997 Cri LJ 1269 was cited to the same effect. Manufacturers of misbranded drugs can be prosecuted at the place where the drug is detected.

On the bona fide error argument, the Court was firm. It observed that whether the petitioner’s mistake was inadvertent, and whether mens rea — that is, criminal intent — was absent, could only be tested through evidence at trial. A Section 482 petition is not the forum to weigh such factual disputes. Whether the medicine had actually reached consumers was likewise a matter to be proved at trial, not assumed in advance.

The Court then turned to vicarious liability under Section 34 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act. After examining the partnership deed, the Court noted that Goyal himself had personally responded to the show cause notices on 29 April 2015. On that material it found him prima facie “in charge of and responsible for” the day-to-day affairs of the firm. This satisfied the standard set in State of Haryana v. Brij Lal Mittal (1998) 5 SCC 343 and Pooja Ravinder Devidasani v. State of Maharashtra (2014) 16 SCC 1.

Stepping back, the Court restated the limits of its own inherent power. It observed: “The inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are to be exercised sparingly.” Where the allegations in a complaint disclose commission of an offence, the Court added, the proceedings ought not to be quashed at the threshold. This meant that even if the petitioner had a strong defence, that defence had to be tested on evidence — not used to abort the trial before it began.

Holding that the material on record discloses a prima facie case, the Court dismissed the petition as devoid of merit. It clarified that none of its observations would prejudice the trial court when it eventually decides the case on its merits. Pending applications were disposed of.

Case details