Denying employer legal representation while workman is assisted by an advocate violates parity: Raj HC

Jodhpur: The Rajasthan High Court on 7 April 2026 quashed an order of the Industrial Disputes Tribunal and Labour Court, Jodhpur, which had barred the All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS), Jodhpur from being represented by a legal practitioner before the Tribunal. Justice Anand Sharma, in a single-bench judgment, held that Section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 does not impose an absolute prohibition on legal representation, and that fairness and parity demand that both parties be accorded equal access to legal assistance.

AIIMS Jodhpur is a statutory body constituted under the All India Institutes of Medical Sciences Act, 1956. Hansraj Sharma, who had been working as a Nursing Officer with the institution, was removed from service on 23 March 2023 following the conclusion of disciplinary proceedings. Aggrieved by the termination, he filed a complaint before the Tribunal under Section 33-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

During the pendency of those proceedings, Hansraj Sharma moved an application under Section 36 of the Act objecting to AIIMS being represented through its advocate, Mr. K.S. Yadav. The Tribunal, by order dated 16 May 2024, allowed the application and restrained AIIMS from appearing through a legal practitioner. AIIMS challenged this order before the High Court.

Ms. Nidhi Singhvi, appearing for AIIMS on behalf of Mr. Deelip Kawadia, submitted that the impugned order was contrary to the scheme of Section 36 of the Act, which does not impose an absolute bar on representation through legal practitioners. She pointed out that the respondent-workman was himself being represented by a practising advocate, Mr. Bhagirath Chandora, who was appearing in the garb of an office bearer of a Union. Counsel argued that the respondent could not be permitted to take a contradictory stand — denying AIIMS the right to legal representation while availing the same benefit through the back door.

Ms. Singhvi further submitted that AIIMS, being a statutory body and not an individual, is entitled to be represented through its duly authorised counsel, and that denial of such representation causes serious prejudice, particularly when complex questions of law are involved. She relied on judgments of the Orissa High Court in G.M., IB Valley Area, Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. v. The P.O., Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court (MANU/OR/0970/2017) and the Bombay High Court in T.K. Varghese v. Nichimen Corporation (MANU/MH/0414/2001).

Mr. Sunil Purohit, appearing for the respondent-workman, submitted that the writ petition was wholly misconceived and deserved dismissal. He argued that Section 36 of the Act clearly restricts representation through legal practitioners unless the consent of the opposite party and leave of the Tribunal are obtained. He contended that Mr. Bhagirath Chandora was not appearing as a legal practitioner but as an office bearer of the Union, which is expressly permissible under Section 36(1) of the Act. The request by AIIMS to appear through an advocate, therefore, directly contravened the legal provision, and the Tribunal’s order was well-reasoned and warranted no interference.

The respondent relied on the Supreme Court judgments in Thyssen Krupp Industries India Private Limited & Ors. v. Suresh Maruti Chougule & Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 6586/2019, decided on 04.10.2023) and Paradip Port Trust, Paradip v. Their Workmen [(1977) 2 SCC 339], as well as a co-ordinate bench decision of the Rajasthan High Court in Ambuja Cements Limited v. Hema Ram & Anr. (S.B. CWP No. 13161/2022, decided on 19.12.2023).

Justice Anand Sharma examined Section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 in detail. The Court observed that Section 36(4) permits representation through a legal practitioner with the consent of the other party and with the leave of the Tribunal — the provision therefore “does not create an absolute prohibition; rather, it confers discretion upon the Tribunal.” The Court emphasised that such discretion must be exercised judiciously and not mechanically.

The Court found that the respondent’s representative, Mr. Bhagirath Chandora, is an enrolled advocate. It held that the plea that he was appearing merely as an office bearer of the Union did not change his professional status, “particularly when he, being an active legal practitioner and an advocate, in substance is rendering legal assistance.” Permitting one party to avail legal expertise while denying the same to the opposite party, the Court held, “results in manifest inequality and violates the principles of natural justice.” Industrial adjudication, though less formal, cannot be rendered one-sided.

The Court then distinguished the judgments cited by the respondent. In Thyssen Krupp and Paradip Port Trust, the Supreme Court had upheld restrictions on legal representation in a different factual setting — where no such imbalance existed. The co-ordinate bench in Ambuja Cements had followed those precedents in similar circumstances. The Court noted that “a precedent is an authority only for what it actually decides and is applicable only when the facts of the case are substantially similar.” In the present case, the factual matrix was entirely different: the party objecting to legal representation was itself availing legal assistance through an advocate. Such a stance, the Court held, “would result in manifest inequality and would run contrary to the fundamental principle of parity embedded in the concept of fairness and equality before law.”

The Court drew support from the Bombay High Court’s judgment in T.K. Varghese, which held that discretion under Section 36 must be exercised to ensure fairness and parity between parties, and from the Orissa High Court in G.M., IB Valley Area, Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd., which held that denying legal representation to one party when the other is effectively assisted by a legally trained person is “unjust and unsustainable.” It also noted a Madras High Court judgment in The Registrar, Anna University & Ors. v. The Presiding Officer, First Additional Labour Court & Ors. (MANU/TN/3946/2023), which held that if a workman engages a trained lawyer as a trade union leader, the management cannot be denied the same right, as that would violate Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

The Court allowed the writ petition and quashed the order dated 16 May 2024 passed by the Industrial Disputes Tribunal and Labour Court, Jodhpur. AIIMS Jodhpur was permitted to be represented through Mr. K.S. Yadav or any other advocate of its choice before the Tribunal. The Tribunal was directed to proceed further in accordance with law, expeditiously. All pending applications, if any, were disposed of.

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