Compromise decree can’t be challenged through fresh suit alleging fraud: Rajasthan High Court rejects plaint

Jaipur: The Rajasthan High Court has held that a civil suit cannot be filed to set aside a revenue court’s compromise decree on allegations of forgery and fraud, ruling that Order 23 Rule 3A CPC bars such a suit and the only remedy is a review before the same revenue court under the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955.

Justice Chandra Prakash Shrimali observed that Order 23 Rule 3A of the Code of Civil Procedure clearly bars a suit to set aside a decree on the ground that the underlying compromise was not lawful, and that the only forum competent to test the legality of such a compromise is the very court that recorded it.

Relying on the Supreme Court’s ruling in R. Rajanna v S.R. Venkataswamy (2014) 15 SCC 471, the Court extracted:

“Order 23 Rule 3-A clearly bars a suit to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful. This implies that no sooner a question relating to lawfulness of the agreement or compromise is raised before the court that passed the decree on the basis of any such agreement or compromise, it is that court and that court alone who can examine and determine that question. The court cannot direct the parties to file a separate suit on the subject for no such suit will lie in view of the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3-A CPC.”

The revision petition arose from a partition dispute traceable to 1978. Three brothers — Gajanand, Jagdish and Narayan, sons of Chhotelal of village Goner, Tehsil Sanganer — were parties to Suit No. 100/78 before the Assistant Collector and Executive Magistrate, Court No. 2, Jaipur, for partition of agricultural land, allotment of separate khatas and assessment of rent. On 21 November 1978 the parties filed a compromise (rajinama) which was acted upon by the revenue court the very next day; a decree was passed in terms of the compromise, the land was partitioned amongst the three brothers, separate khatas were opened, the record of rights was mutated and each party took possession of his share.

Narayan died in July 2008 without ever questioning that decree. Thirty-three years after it had been passed, his sons Ramesh Chand, Dwarika Prasad and Shankar Lal instituted a civil suit before the District and Sessions Judge, Jaipur, contending that Narayan’s signature on the 1978 compromise was forged and fabricated, that he had neither received notice nor engaged any counsel, and that the consequent decree along with all mutations made in favour of the defendants be set aside, with a permanent injunction restraining further alienation. The defendants — Jagdish’s legal heirs — moved an application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC seeking rejection of the plaint as barred by law. By order dated 12 December 2024, the Additional District and Sessions Judge No. 11, Jaipur Metropolitan First, declined to reject the plaint. That refusal was carried in revision to the High Court.

Senior Advocate S.K. Gupta, appearing for the petitioners, submitted that Order 23 Rule 3A read with Section 96(3) CPC creates an absolute bar against a fresh suit attacking a compromise decree, that the scheme of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 and Sections 74 to 84 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act reserve jurisdiction over agricultural-land partitions to revenue courts, and that any grievance touching the genuineness of a compromise recorded in a revenue court had to be ventilated before the same court by way of review under Section 229 of the Tenancy Act or through the appeal and revision channels available within that statutory hierarchy.

For the plaintiffs, it was urged that where a decree is alleged to have been obtained by fraud and the genuineness of the underlying document itself is in question, only a civil court could examine such issues; that for the purposes of Order 7 Rule 11 only the averments in the plaint were germane; and that the plaint expressly pleaded forgery of Narayan’s signature, taking the matter outside the bar of Order 23 Rule 3A.

The Court traced the law through Horil v Keshav & Anr. (2012) 5 SCC 525, R. Rajanna v S.R. Venkataswamy (2014) 15 SCC 471, Pushpa Devi Bhagat v Rajinder Singh (2006) 5 SCC 566, M/s Sree Surya Developers and Promoters v N. Sailesh Prasad and Triloki Nath Singh v Anirudh Singh (2020) 6 SCC 629, noting that the consistent line of authority recognises that the expression “not lawful” in Order 23 Rule 3A covers a compromise decree obtained by fraudulent means, and that the only remedy available to a party seeking to avoid such a decree is to approach the court that recorded the compromise.

Drawing on the coordinate-bench decision in Jitendra Singh Deora v Paras Kanwar (2025:RJ-JD:35097), the Court reiterated:

“It necessarily follows that the adjudication of such a question must be undertaken by the very Court which passed the decree, since it alone is competent to examine whether the compromise was lawful in its inception. This principle stands fortified by the dictum of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sree Surya Developers (supra), wherein it was held that the Court passing the compromise decree retains the jurisdiction to scrutinise its lawfulness upon challenge.”

Applying these principles, the Court held that the plaintiffs ought to have moved the very revenue court — the Assistant Collector and Executive Magistrate, Court No. 2, Jaipur — which had passed the 22 November 1978 decree, by way of an application under Section 229(2) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, a provision that expressly empowers every revenue court other than the Board to review its own decree, order or judgment. Order 23 Rule 3A CPC barred a civil suit and Section 96(3) CPC equally barred an appeal from a consent decree; a compromise decree carried binding effect and operated as estoppel unless and until set aside by the very court that had passed it.

On the question of delay in moving the Order 7 Rule 11 application, the Court relied on Saleem Bhai v State of Maharashtra (2003) 1 SCC 557 to hold that such an application can be entertained at any stage of the suit before the conclusion of trial, and that the trial court is bound to confine itself to the averments in the plaint at that stage. The plaint itself disclosed that the 1978 compromise had been recorded by the revenue court and a decree had followed, and that the decree was now being attacked on the ground that the compromise was forged; on the face of the plaint, therefore, the suit fell squarely within the prohibition of Order 23 Rule 3A.

Allowing the revision petition, the Court set aside the order dated 12 December 2024 and rejected Civil Suit No. 561/2014 under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. Adding that no litigant ought to be left without a remedy, the Court granted the plaintiffs liberty to move the Assistant Collector and Executive Magistrate, Court No. 2, Jaipur — or the successor court presently exercising that jurisdiction — within 30 days, either by way of an application under Section 229(2) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 for review of the 22 November 1978 decree or by pursuing any other appropriate legal remedy available to them, with a direction that the revenue court endeavour to dispose of any such proceeding expeditiously.

Title: Jagdish (since deceased through LRs) v Ramesh Chand & Ors

Case No.: S.B. Civil Revision Petition No. 212/2025

Citation: [2026:RJ-JP:20728]

Counsel for petitioners: Senior Advocate S.K. Gupta, assisted by Anil Kumar Sharma and Surbhi Agarwal

Counsel for respondents: Tanay Goyal; Ram Prasad Sharma for Prahlad Sharma