‘Appellate decree alone survives for execution’: Rajasthan HC rejects limitation plea in 1979 eviction suit

Jaipur: The Rajasthan High Court has held that the 12-year limitation to execute a decree runs from the final appellate order, not the original trial court judgment.

Justice Bipin Gupta gave the ruling on 10 April 2026 while dismissing a writ petition by Ramkanwar, the daughter of a deceased tenant.

The dispute traces back to a 1979 eviction suit filed by Yadvendra Singh and other plaintiffs against Narayan Singh. Narayan Singh was a tenant in property near Rawal Ji Ka Bazar, Gangapole, Jaipur. After his death, his wife Ucchal Singh and four of his sons were impleaded as defendants. Ucchal Singh also died during the pending suit.

On 21 March 2001, the trial court decreed the suit. The First Appellate Court on 21 July 2010 modified the decree in favour of Yadvendra Singh. It directed the defendants to hand over vacant possession and pay mesne profits of Rs. 75 per month from 1 September 1976. The defendants’ second appeal was dismissed by the High Court on 31 May 2024. Their Special Leave Petition was dismissed by the Supreme Court on 9 December 2024.

Yadvendra Singh then filed the execution application on 27 May 2022. Ramkanwar, a daughter of Narayan Singh, was never a party to the suit. She filed objections under Order 21 Rule 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure, read with Section 151. Order 21 Rule 99 allows a person dispossessed of immovable property in execution of a decree to complain to the court. The Executing Court dismissed her objections on 18 December 2025. The Appellate Rent Tribunal, Jaipur Metropolitan-I, refused to stay the execution proceedings by its order dated 20 February 2026. That order was challenged in the present writ petition.

Counsel for Ramkanwar, Krishan Chander Sharma, contended that the execution application was barred by limitation. He invoked Sections 3 and 9 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which require courts to dismiss any suit, application or appeal filed beyond the prescribed period. The statutory period for executing a decree is 12 years from the date it becomes enforceable. The trial court decree was passed on 21 March 2001, while the execution application was filed on 27 May 2022 — nearly 21 years later.

Counsel also argued that Order 41 Rule 5 of the CPC makes clear that merely filing an appeal does not operate as a stay of execution. He therefore submitted that the limitation clock had started from 21 March 2001, the date of the trial court decree. It could not be paused simply because appeals were pending. He further contended that since Ramkanwar was never impleaded in the suit, no decree had been passed against her, and the decree could not be executed against her property.

Senior Advocate Sudhir Gupta, appearing for the decree holder Yadvendra Singh, relied on the doctrine of merger. The trial court’s decree, he submitted, merged into the First Appellate Court’s decree of 21 July 2010. That decree was affirmed by the High Court on 31 May 2024 and attained finality when the Supreme Court dismissed the SLP on 9 December 2024. Once an appellate decree is passed, the trial court’s decree ceases to have independent existence.

He also argued that the law governing tenancies treats successors differently. A person who succeeds to tenancy rights from a deceased tenant continues in possession as a joint tenant — not a co-tenant. A decree against one joint tenant is therefore executable against every other joint tenant, including Ramkanwar.

Justice Bipin Gupta first noted the narrow scope of the High Court’s power under Article 227 of the Constitution, which gives High Courts supervisory jurisdiction over subordinate courts and tribunals. The Court relied on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Sadhana Lodh vs National Insurance Company and Ranjeet Singh vs Ravi Prakash. Its supervisory jurisdiction, Justice Gupta observed, is available only where there is a flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or a patent error not requiring elaborate examination.

The Court identified the only question before it as whether execution of the decree was barred by limitation.

On the doctrine of merger, Justice Gupta held that the trial court’s decree had been absorbed into the appellate decree. He observed: “In consequence, the decree as affirmed, modified, or substituted by the learned Appellate Court alone survives and attains enforceability. The decree of the Trial Court ceases to have independent existence and is subsumed in the appellate decree, which becomes the sole operative decree for the purposes of execution.” In plain terms: once an appeal is decided, the appellate order is the only decree that can be executed. The 12-year limitation clock begins from that date, not from the original trial court judgment.

The Court drew on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala. That judgment holds that there cannot be more than one operative decree governing the same subject matter at a given point in time. It also relied on Surinder Pal Soni vs Sohan Lal and Balbir Singh vs Baldev Singh. In those cases the Supreme Court confirmed that an appellate decree alone becomes executable. The decree holder’s right to enforce it cannot be defeated.

The Court rejected the petitioner’s reliance on Order 41 Rule 5 CPC — which provides that mere filing of an appeal does not stay execution. Justice Gupta clarified that a decree does remain enforceable during the pendency of an appeal in the absence of a stay. But the question of when limitation begins to run is governed by a different principle — the principle of when the decree attains finality.

He cited the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Gajanan v. Prahlad, decided on 18 March 2026. That case held that an appeal is a continuation of the original proceedings. Even dismissal of an appeal on technical grounds — including default or non-prosecution — resets the limitation clock for execution. Such dismissal confirms the trial court’s decree through the doctrine of merger.

The Court distinguished the judgments cited by the petitioner. Khurana Brothers vs Anand Bardhan concerned withdrawal of an appeal, not its adjudication on merits. Dr. Jagmittar Sain Bhagat vs Director, Health Services, Haryana dealt with inherent lack of jurisdiction. Bimal Kumar vs Shakuntala Debi concerned a parallel suit challenging a decree on grounds of fraud. None of those situations applied to Ramkanwar’s case.

On the argument that Ramkanwar was not a party to the suit, the Court rejected the plea. Relying on its earlier decision in Chaya Sethi vs Jitnendra Bohra, Justice Gupta held that the rule is settled. A person who succeeds to tenancy rights from a father does not become a co-tenant but continues in possession as a joint tenant. Once a decree has been passed against any one joint tenant, it is executable against every other joint tenant.

The Court also noted that Ramkanwar had not approached the High Court in a timely manner. She had earlier filed an application under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC seeking impleadment in the second appeal but withdrew it. Her subsequent recall application was dismissed by a Coordinate Bench on 9 May 2024 with costs of Rs. 25,000 — an order that attained finality. Justice Gupta observed that after having suffered multiple adverse orders, the petitioner could not now be permitted to stall the execution proceedings.

The writ petition was dismissed as devoid of merit. The order dated 20 February 2026 passed by the Appellate Rent Tribunal, Jaipur Metropolitan-I, in CMA No. 05/2026 — refusing to stay the execution proceedings — was upheld. Pending applications, if any, were disposed of.

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